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MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: BID RIGGING BY PRIVATE
EQUITY FIRMS IN MULTIBILLION DOLLAR LBOS
Christopher M. Burke,* Stephanie A. Hackett,** David W. Mitchell,***
Simon J. Wilke,**** Melanie Stallings Williams,***** Michael A.
Williams,****** and Wei Zhao*******
In the first successful case of its kind, a class action alleging
widespread collusion in the market for leveraged buyouts, some of the
world’s largest private equity firms settled Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners,
LLC for $590.5 million. The case was unique not only for its size and the
fact that it involved complex financial transactions instead of a typical
commodity, but also because the claimants used auction theory to
demonstrate both the “plus” factors required to prove antitrust injury and
the resulting damages. Economic analyses show that the cost to
shareholders of collusion in the eight litigated multi-billion dollar
leveraged buyout transactions approached $12 billion.
The use of empirical economic analysis in antitrust litigation is now de
rigueur. Courts expect it, and litigants have an array of econometricians
available who understand both how to work with data and antitrust
doctrine. In “ordinary” commodities price fixing cases, plaintiffs and
defendants are expected to engage experts who gather transaction data
and apply regression theory and other economic analyses to contest
whether it is possible to demonstrate injury, impact, and damages. Dahl
was not an ordinary case in that it involved neither a commodity nor a
sellers’ cartel. Instead, it involved a buyers’ cartel which, Plaintiffs
alleged, conspired to drive down the price of a number of unique, large
LBOs during the mid-2000s. Additionally, the case was notable because
of the Plaintiffs’ decision to use the auction theory to demonstrate the
existence of antitrust violations and the extent of damages
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, after nearly seven years of litigation, a shareholder class of
investors settled their antitrust claims against some of the world’s largest
private equity (“PE”) firms – Bain Capital Partners, Blackstone Group,
Carlyle, Goldman Sachs, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Silver Lake
Technology Management, and TPG Capital – who agreed to pay $590.5
million.1 The case arose from an article in the Wall Street Journal
1. Andrew Harris, Buyout Firms’ $590 Million Collusion Settlement Approved,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2014, 1:50 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-0930/buyout-firms-590-million-collusion-settlement-approved.
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reporting that the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) sent a letter asking certain PE firms to provide it with
information regarding bidding for the acquisition of companies.
Ultimately, the DOJ declined to bring action for alleged antitrust
violations.2 In 2007, a proposed class of shareholders alleged that the
world’s largest PE firms had violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1, by
conspiring to suppress the prices paid to shareholders in several large
leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”).3 The case was unusual in that the
shareholder class alleged an overarching conspiracy by a buyers’ cartel
that did not involve the purchase of a commodity, but instead involved
fairly unique and complex LBOs of large public corporations. The use of
club deals (i.e., agreements among PE firms to share capital, valuations,
and sector expertise) reduced the number of bidders and provided an
environment conducive to collusion.
While the case was notable for both its size and subject matter,4 it was
likewise novel in the way it demonstrated impact and harm: through the
use of auction theory. Regression analysis has been a common means of
demonstrating antitrust injury5 and one scholar used the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) to demonstrate whether these private equity
acquisitions should be viewed as anticompetitive.6 However, the use of
auction theory in the class action permitted the claimants not only to
demonstrate injury and damages, but also to develop “plus factors”
demonstrating the “concerted action” requirement of a Section 1 claim.
The economic analyses, combined with the record of contemporaneous
communications and deposition testimony, demonstrate that the seven
major private equity firms7 entered into a market allocation and bid
rigging agreement from 2003 to 2007 that reduced the prices paid in eight
multibillion-dollar LBOs by $11.97 billion. In this article, we explain how
auction theory was used to show the existence of a market allocation and

2. White & Case LLP, A Recent Court Decision Revives Concern That Some Club Deals Could
Violate
the
Antitrust
Laws,
LEXOLOGY
(Feb.
5,
2009),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ab238d4b-9ba0-4093-a58b-4ec0df4538f6.
3. Complaint at 1-2, Davidson v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-EFH (D.
Mass. filed Dec. 28, 2007).
4. For a discussion of the rise of bid rigging cartel behavior worldwide and the effect of fines
on deterrence, see Emilie Dargaud, Andrea Mantovani & Carlo Reggiani, Cartel Punishment and the
Distortive Effects of Fines, 12 J. OF COMPETITION LAW & ECON. 375 (2016).
5. See, e.g., Lawrence Wu, ECONOMETRICS: LEGAL, PRACTICAL, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES 34170 (2d ed. 2014).
6. Jon Fougner, Comment, Antitrust Enforcement in Private Equity: Target, Bidder, and Club
Sizes Should Matter, 31 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 25 (Oct. 6, 2013).
7. Complaint at 4-6, Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass. Dec.
28, 2007). (Defendant private equity firms included Bain Capital Partners, Blackstone Group, Carlyle
Group, Goldman Sachs Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Silver Lake Technology Management,
and TPG Capital).
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bid rigging agreement that resulted in antitrust impact and damages.8
DEMONSTRATING PLUS FACTORS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AND
IMPACT FROM COLLUSION IN THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET
While auction theory has been proposed as a way to obtain optimal
results in the market for corporate control,9 the Dahl case was the first
prominent instance of the use of auction theory to demonstrate antitrust
injury and damages. Game theory, which auction theory is a form of, has
been introduced into merger analysis since the 1992 revision of the
Merger Guidelines,10 including its application to coordinated interactions
(for example, collusion in the market).11 Plaintiffs in antitrust actions
often rely on regression analysis to demonstrate antitrust injury and
damages.12 Dahl, however, was the first reported example of the use of
auction theory to demonstrate the existence of plus factors as proof of
conspiracy along with demonstrating the degree of harm resulting from
the collusion.
We begin with an overview of the private equity industry, followed by
a discussion of the dynamics of market allocation and bid rigging. We
then apply auction theory to demonstrate the existence of antitrust
violations in the Dahl case and the degree of harm resulting from the
collusion.
The Private Equity Industry
A PE firm is a partnership or limited liability corporation that raises
equity capital through PE funds.13 In a typical PE transaction where the
PE firm buys a company, the buyout is financed 60% to 90% with debt—
hence the term leveraged buyout—and 10% to 40% with funds from
investors, including principals at the PE firms.14 In an LBO, purchasers,
often PE firms, acquire most of a company’s outstanding shares with a
substantial amount of debt financing. Purchasers then take the company
8. Authors Christopher M. Burke, Stephanie A. Hackett, and David W. Mitchell served as
counsel and authors Simon J. Wilke, Michael A. Williams and Wei Zhao as testifying and consulting
experts, respectively, for Plaintiffs in the action.
9. Christina M. Sautter, Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with Friends and Foes in a
Sale of Corporate Control, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 521 (2013).
10. Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Daubert, Science, and Modern Game Theory:
Implications for Merger Analysis, 20 S. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 126 (2012).
11. U.S. Dept. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 62
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1559, Section 2.2 (1992).
12. See, e.g., supra note 5.
13. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 121, 122 (2009).
14. Id. at 125.
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private by withdrawing their shares from the public exchange and operate
it for a period of time. Thereafter, the purchasers sell it to a strategic rival
or other PE firm or they conduct an initial public offering (“IPO”) and
return ownership to the public markets.
LBO activity boomed in the early 1980s, slowed in the 1990s, and
thrived again starting in 2001.15 The value of PE LBO deals in the U.S.
surged from $30 billion in 2001 to over $450 billion in 2007. 16 In 2006
and 2007, PE funds exceeded 1% of the U.S. stock market’s value.17
However, LBO activity stagnated in 2008 due to the Great Recession and
the resulting freeze in the credit markets upon which PE firms depend.
Since the first LBO boom in the 1980s, PE LBOs have evolved to
become less associated with “hostile takeovers.” Instead, PE firms more
typically cooperate with incumbent boards of directors and their officers
to cultivate relationships to effectuate “friendly takeovers.” 18 As a result,
their holdings have expanded to include companies in the financial
services, technology, healthcare, manufacturing, and retail industries.19
Throughout the 2001-2007 boom, PE firms shifted their focus from
primarily purchasing noncore business units of large public companies to
buying public companies as a whole.20 PE firms have also increasingly
partaken in “club deals,” which are joint agreements between two or more
PE firms to pool their resources, expertise, and investment funds’ capital
to buy target companies.21 Of the ten largest completed club deal LBOs
of U.S. target companies since 2000, all of the deals included at least one
of the named Defendants in Dahl and six of the ten LBOs were proprietary
club deals that formed part of the overarching conspiracy in Dahl.22 Club
deals surged in 2004, peaked in 2007, and accounted for 44% of the $1.05
trillion total LBO deal value in the 2000 to 2007 period.23
Developments in the PE industry sparked debates and criticisms of PE
15. Micah S. Officer, Oguzhan Ozbas & Berk A. Sensoy, Club Deals in Leveraged Buyouts,
98 J. OF FIN. ECON. 214, 214 (2010).
16. Id.
17. Supra note 13, at 125.
18. One example of a “friendly takeover” was in the SunGuard LBO, where Silver Lake
cultivated a relationship with the SunGard board of directors and executives. In addition to managements’
participation in the buyout, five-year employment contracts were negotiated with the top seven executives,
which offered the executives the opportunity to invest up to $35 million of their proceeds from the sale of
the company into new company stock, and included a 15% incentive equity stake of the new company
stock. Redacted Fifth Amended Complaint at 69, Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 1:07-cv-12388 (D.
Mass. Oct. 10, 2012).
19. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-885, PRIVATE EQUITY: RECENT GROWTH
IN LEVERAGED BUYOUTS EXPOSED RISKS THAT WARRANT CONTINUED ATTENTION 10 (2008).
20. Felix Barber & Michael Goold, The Strategic Secret of Private Equity, 85 HARV. BUS.
REV. 53, 56 (2007).
21. Supra note 19, at 5.
22. Id. at 27.
23. Id. at 24-25.
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activities, especially club deals. One criticism is that PE firms can collude
through club deals to depress acquisition prices by limiting the number of
firms bidding in an auction.24 Even without collusion, clubbing can
decrease competition by reducing the number of bids and, consequently,
lower premiums for target companies’ shareholders.25 PE executives
argue that club deals form primarily because one firm may not have
sufficient capital in funds to buy companies alone or may face constraints
on how much capital can be invested in one LBO. Some executives claim
that club deals allow bids that would not otherwise be possible, and
therefore, increase competition.26 The financial media began voicing
concerns about club deals in 2005, and the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division opened an investigation into this practice in 2006.27
The United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
conducted an analysis that looked at public-to-private LBOs completed
from 1998 to 2007 and, after controlling for differences in target
companies, found that such club deals, in aggregate, were not associated
with lower or higher per share price premiums. The GAO found no
evidence of an anticompetitive effect on acquisition prices. 28 However,
the GAO warned that its conclusions were based on an association, not a
causal relationship, between club deals and premiums. The GAO
cautioned that its findings may not generalize to the overall population of
club deals as it examined a subset of all PE deals.29
Officer et al., by contrast, focused on club deals between January 1984
and September 2007 that were worth more than $100 million.30 The
rationale for examining this set of LBOs was that concerns regarding club
deals were mainly associated with large LBOs completed by prominent
PE firms.31 With this targeted sample, Officer et al. found that premiums
in club deals were 40% lower than those in sole-sponsored LBOs.32 In
response to such competitive concerns, shareholders of target companies
24. TPG’s founder David Bonderman observed that formation of “[c]onsortia . . . limits
bidding” and ensures that “[there’s] less competition for the biggest deals.” Redacted Fifth Amended
Complaint at 3, Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 1:07-cv-12388, (D. Mass. Oct. 10, 2012). A
Blackstone executive wrote about Texas Genco that Blackstone’s message to TPG and KKR was “better
for everyone to join forces and have a much higher chance of winning the deal and not drive the price
up.” Id. at 84-85. KKR compared Texas Genco to SunGard, where “the large PE universe was all working
together,” and “there was no competition.” Id. at 68.
25. Supra note 15, at 215.
26. Supra note 19, at 5.
27. Supra note 15, at 237.
28. Supra note 19, at 33-34.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Micah S. Officer, Oguzhan Ozbas & Berk A. Sensoy, Club Deals in Leveraged Buyouts,
98 J. OF FIN. ECON. 214 (2010).
31. This sample includes deals completed by the end of November 2007. See supra note 14, at
218.
32. Id. at 237.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2

36

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

filed antitrust lawsuits against PE firms.33
Antitrust claims against PE firms had been notoriously difficult to
make, with at least one court looking at club deals and declining to find
that the claim had been stated.34 Dahl35 advanced a novel theory that
posited a conspiracy beyond an agreement to fix the price of a single
LBO. In Dahl, the Plaintiffs accused the major PE firms of violating
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by forming an illegal market allocation and
bid rigging to fix the prices of the largest LBOs through the use of, inter
alia, club deals.36 In a market allocation agreement, competitors divide
markets among themselves. In a bid rigging agreement, by contrast,
competitors decide who will be chosen to win a bid on a contract instead
of allowing the competitive bidding process to determine the winner.
Market Allocation and Bid rigging
The Sherman Act has, as its premise, the notion that competition “will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the presentation of our
democratic political and social institutions.”37 Collusive agreements, such
as price-fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation, unreasonably restrict
competitive conditions and harm consumers. Section 1 of the Act
prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations.”38 Proving a violation of Section 1 requires proof
of (1) the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy among two
or more separate entities (2) that unreasonably restrains trade39 and (3)
33. Supra note 19, at 6.
34. See Pennsylvania Ave. Funds v. Borey, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134–35 (W.D. Wash. 2008)
(court dismissed the antitrust claim for failure to state a claim under the Sherman Act); see also Finnegan
v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 827-32 (2d Cir. 1990) (the Second Circuit held that the federal securities
law precludes application of the antitrust laws to rival bidders that ultimately joined forces to acquire a
target company).
35. No. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass).
36. The Plaintiffs in Dahl presented record evidence of an overarching conspiracy to fix prices
of large proprietary LBOs. After threatening one another’s proprietary club deals [HCA and Freescale],
Tony James of Blackstone reported that “Henry Kravis [KKR] just called to say congratulations and that
they were standing down because he had told me before they would not jump a signed deal of ours.” Tony
James told George Roberts of KKR, “We would much rather work with you guys than against you.
Together we can be unstoppable but in opposition we can cost each other a lot of money.” George Roberts
responded, “Agreed.” After hearing the news that KKR agreed to stand down on Freescale, a Goldman
Sachs executive observed “club etiquette prevails.” Redacted Fifth Amended Complaint at 142-43, Dahl
v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass. filed Oct. 10, 2012).
37. Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
39. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (Section 1 prohibits only those
restraints that unreasonably restrict competitive conditions).
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affects interstate or foreign commerce.40
When competitors collude and agree to concerted action, the consumer
is harmed while the conspirators are unlawfully rewarded. Collusive
agreements typically consist of three components. Conspirators (1) reach
an agreement on terms of trade, (2) distribute the collusive gains via a
market allocation agreement, and (3) monitor and enforce compliance.41
Proving collusion is complicated by the fact that firms can act in parallel,
consciously, without necessarily violating the Sherman Act.42 In
oligopolies, for example, firms can act in parallel non-collusively because
they understand their roles in a repeated game.43 Therefore, to prove that
a Section 1 conspiracy exists, a plaintiff must show more evidence than
the defendants’ parallel action—a plaintiff must be able to prove that the
defendants acted in parallel pursuant to a collusive agreement.44
While collusion can be proven with either direct or circumstantial
evidence,45 direct proof is understandably scarce when documenting
unlawful conspiracies.46 Detecting market allocation and bid rigging
agreements, like other Section 1 violations, is generally difficult because
collusive agreements are typically reached in secret and rarely leave a trail
of direct evidence that demonstrates concerted action. Of course, as
Judges Posner and Easterbrook observed, “conspiracies organized so that
they do not produce evidence of actual communications are no less
harmful than conspiracies that leave a trail of such evidence.”47
As a result, claimants “typically must prove other facts and
circumstances (often referred to as ‘plus factors’) in combination with
conscious parallelism to support an inference of concerted action.”48 Plus
factors are circumstantial evidence of actions or conduct “highly unlikely
to occur in the absence of a collusive agreement.”49 The most important
40. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. V. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 824 (6th Cir. 2011). For a discussion,
see 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2 (8th ed. 2017).
41. William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors
and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 408 (2011).
42. See, e.g., Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004).
43. Supra note 41, at 393. See also ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 267-68 (2d ed. 2008).
44. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) (“conscious parallelism” is “not in itself
unlawful”); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)
(“[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the
traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but ‘conscious parallelism’ has not read conspiracy out of
the Sherman Act entirely”).
45. 1 ABA SECTION ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 6 (8th ed. 2017).
46. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 720 (1965) (“Only rarely
will there be direct evidence of an express agreement” in conspiracy cases).
47. RICHARD POSNER & FRANK EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND
OTHER MATERIALS 341 (2d ed. 1981).
48. Supra note 45, at 11.
49. Supra note 41, at 405.
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plus factors generally show that an action or conduct would be contrary
to the conspirators’ self-interests had they acted alone.50
The Defendant firms in Dahl were comprised of highly educated
individuals, many with MBAs, PhDs, and law degrees from elite
institutions. They worked with lawyers at top defense law firms regularly
and accessed capital from the largest money center banks in the world.
These were not individuals who were going to simply broadcast their
intent to violate a statute that includes criminal penalties. Thus, economic
analysis was going to be a critical element for the Plaintiffs to prove the
existence of an unlawful agreement.
Using Auction Theory to Demonstrate Antitrust Impact
In Dahl there was traditional evidence, such as email communications
and internal firm memoranda, to prove an agreement among the PE firms
to allocate the LBO market and rig bids. The case was compelling,
however, because of the development of plus factors through the use of
auction theory.
Auction theory states that if a market is competitive, the price should
rise until there remains only one bidder.51 This has several empirical
implications, including: (1) the bidder with the highest valuation should
win, i.e., the sale is efficient; (2) the valuation of the second highest bidder
should set the winning price; and (3) since the winning price is below the
winner’s valuation, the winner’s expected profit increases as its
ownership share of the winning deal increases.
In the presence of collusion, e.g., a bidding ring or buyers’ cartel,
auction theory has a number of contrasting empirical implications,
including: (1) it is impossible to obtain full efficiency, so a bidder with a
valuation below the highest valuation will win sometimes; (2) when the
cartel operates successfully, the winning bid is below the second-highest
valuation; and (3) the cartel needs some arrangement to spread the
benefits of the lower winning bid among the non-winning bidders. These
contrasting characteristics describe the present case and indicate the
presence of collusion.
In Dahl, auction theory was used to demonstrate the existence of six
plus factors: (1) inefficiency in the auctions; (2) winning bids below the
estimated competitive price; (3) redistribution of gains and losses; (4) bid
reduction below competitive benchmark prices; (5) communication and
monitoring; and (6) large club deals reduced the number of bidders.52 The
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. OF ECON.
LITERATURE 699 (1987).
52. No. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass), Document 1020-2, pp. 25-27, 31.
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ability to demonstrate multiple plus factors allows the determination of
whether firms’ actions are more likely than not the result of an agreement
to be made more precisely.53 The six plus factors, in combination with
parallel conduct among PE firms, supported an inference of concerted
action in Dahl. When considering the plus factors jointly across the
totality of the deals, along with the nature of the repeated interactions of
the market participants, the economic analyses show that the PE firms’
conduct was (1) consistent with coordinated behavior and inconsistent
with competition and (2) more likely than not the result of a market
allocation and bid rigging agreement. That is, the economic evidence
tended to exclude the possibility that the PE firms acted independently.
Further descriptions along with the underlying analyses of these plus
factors are contained in Appendix I.
Using Auction Theory to Demonstrate Antitrust Damages
In addition to using auction theory to develop plus factors (and
therefore evidence of collusion), Dahl is notable for its use of auction
theory to demonstrate antitrust injury and to quantify damages. The
analysis was premised on the proposition that the PE firms’ conduct in a
given LBO transaction resulted in antitrust impact and damage to class
members if the actual price was less than the but-for competitive price.
The issues of impact and damages were circular; if the auction prices
hadn’t been suppressed, there would be no impact and consequently no
damages. Calculating damages was simply a matter of measuring the delta
of what should have been paid per share (had there been no collusion)
multiplied by the number of affected shares.
The damages methodology determined the competitive price of each
LBO transaction by estimating the PE firms’ equity valuations per share
but for the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. A PE
firm’s but-for equity valuation per share for a transaction equaled the
maximum price per share it was willing to pay given the but-for
competitive internal rate of return (“IRR”), i.e., the IRR that would have
prevailed but for the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement.
According to economic theory, if a market is competitive, the price
should rise to the point where supply equals demand. In the case where a
single unit is for sale, such as a firm, price rises because of competition
to the point where only a single bidder remains.54 This has several
53. See, e.g., supra note 41, at 393.
54. See, e.g., Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON.
REV. 180, 180 (1996) (“In an absolute English auction, in which the price rises continuously until only
one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid, the sale price equals the lowest
competitive price at which supply equals demand.”).
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empirical implications, including (1) the bidder with the highest valuation
should win and (2) the valuation of the second-highest bidder should set
the winning price. For example, suppose there were three potential buyers
of a given item. Each buyer has a maximum willingness to pay for the
item, so one of the buyers has the highest willingness to pay. The seller’s
goal is to obtain the highest price. To induce the seller to sell the item, the
buyer with the highest willingness to pay has to offer slightly more than
the buyer with the second-highest willingness to pay. Applied to this case,
this means the competitive price equals the second highest equity
valuation per share.
In a seminal article for which he won the Nobel Prize in Economics,
William Vickrey55 showed that under standard economic assumptions,
many auction formats are equivalent in the sense that (1) the formats end
up with the same rule regarding who wins the object and (2) the expected
pricing rule is the same. In particular, for all the auction formats
considered by Professor Vickrey, the sale mechanism is efficient, i.e., the
entity with the highest value for the object gets it and so rule (1) is
determined. Moreover, the expected price paid is exactly equal to the
second-highest valuation and so the pricing rule (2) is uniquely
determined. This cornerstone result is known as the “Revenue
Equivalence Theorem.”56 A well-known and highly successful
application of auction theory is the Federal Communications
Commission’s (“FCC”) sale of radio spectrum.57
Based on the above economic analyses, the damages methodology
proceeds as follows. Economic theory establishes that, for each
transaction, the competitive price equals the second highest equity
valuation per share. Using the PE firms’ own valuation models for each
55. William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. OF
FIN. 8 (1961).
56. See, e.g., PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 16-19 (2004); VIJAY
KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 27-34 (2d ed. 2010).
57.
See,
About
Auctions,
FED.
COMMC’N
COMM’N,
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=about_auctions
(“Since
1994,
the
Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted auctions of licenses for electromagnetic spectrum. .
. . The Commission has found that spectrum auctions more effectively assign licenses than either
comparative hearings or lotteries. The auction approach is intended to award the licenses to those who
will use them most effectively. Additionally, by using auctions, the Commission has reduced the average
time from initial application to license grant to less than one year, and the public is now receiving the
direct financial benefit from the award of licenses. . . . In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress
extended and expanded the FCC’s auction authority.”). See also R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan &
Simon Wilkie, The Greatest Auction in History, in BETTER LIVING THROUGH ECONOMICS, 168, 181-82
(John J. Siegfried, ed., 2009) (“Academic economists, working with FCC staff and especially FCC
economist Evan Kwerel, created an auction form that has been used to sell over $100 billion dollars of
spectrum in dozens of countries. The design reflected trade-offs that were understood only because of the
development of auction theory in the 1980s and thus implemented recent innovations in economic
analysis. The FCC auction performed well by a variety of measures and seems to have balanced revenue
and efficiency.”).
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LBO, the PE firms’ equity valuations per share were calculated but for
the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. This analysis
reveals the competitive price of each transaction since that price equals
the second-highest valuation. These damages calculations, reported in
detail in Appendix II, show what the IRRs would have been if not for the
alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. The total classwide
damages across the disputed LBO transactions equal approximately
$11.97 billion.
CONCLUSIONS
The Dahl case extends the use of economic analysis, and specifically
auction theory, in antitrust matters, including class action cases. In
particular, the Dahl case extends the use of economic analysis in antitrust
by using auction theory to (1) specify and empirically test plus factors
used to evaluate the likelihood of collusion; (2) provide a methodology
utilizing evidence common to class members to demonstrate that
members of a proposed class incurred a common impact as a result of the
alleged collusive conduct; and (3) provide a methodology based on
generally accepted economics that can be used reliably to quantify
classwide damages.
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APPENDIX I FACTORS
Plus factor 1: Inefficiency in the auctions
The LBO auctions were inefficient: the bidder with the highest
valuation did not win the sale. This fact is inconsistent with models of
competitive behavior since under competition, competing bidders bid up
to their individual valuations. In contrast, auction theory predicts that
auctions will be inefficient when a cartel exists. In particular, if the values
of the two highest bidders are very close, the cartel will select a lower
valuation bidder to win the auction.
The Plaintiffs in Dahl calculated a bidders’ gross value of winning the
transaction from that bidder’s data (when available). For the purpose of
the calculations, we assume a standard LBO plan of purchasing the target
firm with a given leverage ratio and holding the target firm for five years
before exiting. This is a common time horizon in the analyses undertaken
by PE firms. The PE firm with the highest enterprise exit valuation of the
target firm after five years should have been able to offer the highest
initial equity premium. Therefore, we identify the PE firm with the
highest enterprise exit value as the high-value bidder.
Freescale, HCA, Kinder Morgan, and TXU were “strongly” inefficient,
i.e., the bidder with the highest valuation is not in the winning club (see
Table 1). AMC, Aramark, Harrah’s, and SunGard, were “partially”
inefficient, i.e., even though the highest-valuation bidder was a member
of the winning club, at least one bidder that did not have the highest
valuation was also a member of the winning club. This economic
evidence is contrary to what is expected in a competitive setting,
suggesting that competition in these auctions was suppressed. These
actions constitute a plus factor—that is, actions or conduct (in this case a
significant number of the auctions being inefficient) unlikely to occur in
the absence of a collusive agreement. These findings provide evidence of
bidder collusion in the transactions.
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Table 1
Independent Plus Factor 1: Inefficiency in the LBOs
PE Firm with the Highest
Equity Valuation

Transaction

PE Firm

Equity
Valuation
($ mil)

AMC

Apollo

834.8

Aramark

J.P.
Morgan

6,506.4

Freescale

KKR/Silv
er Lake

19,047.3

Harrah’s

TPG

17,745.8

HCA

Goldman
Sachs

27,525.7

Kinder
Morgan

J.P.
Morgan

21,056.7

SunGard

TXU

Silver
Lake

Apollo

11,259.4

34,589.7

Equity
Valuation
($ mil)
834.8
778.5

Does the
winning
PE firm
have the
highest
value?
Yes
No

6,497.4
6,506.4

No
Yes

6,464.3
6,495.1
16,534.9
15,724.7
XXX
15,666.6
XXX
17,745.8
21,300.6
20,762.0
23,304.4
XXX
18,463.9

No
No
No
No
XXX
No
XXX
Yes
No
No
No
XXX
No

20,038.3
11,038.7
10,301.7

No
No
No

XXX
10,227.2
XXX
11,259.4
10,990.7

XXX
No
XXX
Yes
No

31,361.4
32,366.8
30,993.1
32,244.3

No
No
No
No

Winning PE Firm(s)

PE Firm
Apollo
J.P. Morgan
Goldman
Sachs
J.P. Morgan
T. H. Lee
Warburg
Pincus
Blackstone
Carlyle
Permira
TPG
Apollo
TPG
Bain
KKR
Merrill Lynch
AIG
Carlyle
Goldman
Sachs
Bain
Blackstone
Goldman
Sachs
KKR
Providence
Silver Lake
TPG
Goldman
Sachs
J.P. Morgan
KKR
TPG

Notes:
“XXX” indicates that there was no sufficient information to estimate an equity valuation for the PE
firm. All valuation estimates are based on the CAPM methodology described in Section VI.B.
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1020-2 (D. Mass. filed
Aug. 12, 2014), at 28.
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Plus factor 2: Winning bids below the estimated competitive price
The second type of conduct against a firm’s unilateral self-interest
related to the existence of winning bids below the estimated competitive
price. Competition in an ascending auction determines a winning bid that
is greater than the second-highest valuation. Consider an auction in which
the winning bid b is less than the second-highest valuation v. By bidding
b+ε, where ε is a negligibly small number, the bidder with valuation v can
win the auction. Therefore, by not submitting a competing bid, the bidder
with valuation v forgoes a surplus equal to v – b – ε. Thus, a winning bid
less than the second-highest valuation shows that the firms engaged in
actions against their unilateral economic self-interests, absent the
existence of an agreement.
If the market for large LBOs were competitive, the acquisition price
would be forced up to the point where the bidder with the second-highest
valuation would just earn a competitive rate of return. Since the target
firms were large publicly traded firms, the opportunity cost for an investor
is purchasing a portfolio of stocks. So, for example, one might take the
long-run rate of return on the S&P 500 index as a benchmark competitive
rate of return. In the following analysis, the Plaintiffs used 10% as the
competitive rate of return. Note that at this price, the winner of the
transaction expects to exceed a 10% rate of return.
We conclude that in all eight of LBOs, the winning bid was less than
the estimated competitive price (see Table 2). The weighted-average of
the winning bids was more than 9% below the estimated competitive
price.
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Table 2
Independent Plus Factor 2: Winning Bid Below the Estimated
Competitive Price
PE Firm with the Second-Highest
Equity Valuation
Equity
Valuatio
n ($ mil)

Estimated
Competitiv
e Price

Transaction

PE Firm

AMC

J.P.
Morgan

778.5

778.5

Aramark

Goldman
Sachs

6,497.4

6,497.4

16,534.9

16,948.2

Harrah’s

Blackstone
Goldman
Sachs

17,400.7

17,400.7

HCA

Blackstone

24,630.2

24,630.2

Kinder
Morgan

Goldman
Sachs

20,038.3

20,038.3

SunGard

Bain

11,038.7

11,038.7

Freescale

TXU

J.P.
Morgan

32,366.8

32,366.8

Bid
($ mil)

Is the
winning
bid below
the
estimated
competitiv
e price?

722.9

Yes

6,091.9

Yes

Winning PE Firm(s)

PE Firm
Apollo
J.P.
Morgan
Goldman
Sachs
J.P.
Morgan
T. H. Lee
Warburg
Pincus
Blackstone
Carlyle
Permira
TPG
Apollo
TPG
Bain
KKR
Merrill
Lynch
AIG
Carlyle
Goldman
Sachs
Bain
Blackstone
Goldman
Sachs
KKR
Providenc
e
Silver
Lake
TPG
Goldman
Sachs

J.P.
Morgan
KKR
TPG

16,534.
9
16,699.
3

Yes
Yes

20,886.
9

Yes

14,404.
0

Yes

10,452.
2

Yes

31,937.
9

Yes

Source: Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1020-2 (D. Mass.
filed Aug. 12, 2014), at 29.
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Plus factor 3: Redistribution of gains and losses
In any cartel, a redistribution mechanism to share the profits among
members is required. This is especially true in the case of a bid rigging
agreement where the items being purchased are relatively costly
individual units purchased infrequently. In particular, if a bidder in an
individual auction “stands down,” and drops out when the price is
significantly below their valuation, then they are leaving money on the
table and granting the profit to another bidder, i.e., the winner.
This action is against their unilateral self-interest absent some
compensation mechanism. For example, the bidder who stood down
could be rewarded with a quid pro quo in future auctions or receive a side
payment in the current auction. Such a side payment could involve being
brought into the winning club in the current deal or receiving some other
financial benefit from the current deal.
In an ascending auction with private bidder values, competing bidders
bid up to their individual valuations. Therefore, no losing bidder would
want to join the “winning club” bid because that would imply that such a
bidder obtains a negative surplus. Many auctions resulted in deals in
which non-winning PE firms were brought into the deal. Thus, the PE
firms appeared to be acting against their unilateral self-interests in that the
winning bidder invited the losing bidders into the club to share the
benefits.
In the case of ascending auctions with a common value component,
auction theory shows that lower-value bidders may want to join the
winning bid, since in this case the high-value bidder has a strategy that
ensures a positive profit when winning the auction. However, in this case,
the winning bidder would act against its unilateral self-interest (in the
absence of an agreement) by sharing its profits with other, lowervaluation bidders.
In six of the eight LBOs (AMC, Aramark, Freescale, Harrah’s, Kinder
Morgan, SunGard), non-winning PE firms were invited into the
transaction (i.e., asked to join and either did or did not join). In three of
the eight LBOs (Aramark, Freescale, Harrah’s), non-winning PE firms
were brought into the transaction (i.e., asked to join and accepted). These
actions constitute a plus factor—that is, actions or conduct (in this case
winners inviting non-winning Defendant PE firms into a transaction)
unlikely to occur in the absence of a collusive agreement. These findings
provide evidence of bidder collusion in the transactions.
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Apollo, J.P.
Morgan

Bain (Sankaty)

Blackstone,
Goldman, T.H. Lee,
TPG

KKR
Financial
Corp.**

Bain
(Sankaty)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Was a nonwinning PE
firm invited
into the deal?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Was a nonwinning PE firm
brought into the
deal?

Non-Winning
PE Firm(s)
Brought Into
Deal

AMC
Goldman Sachs,
J.P. Morgan, T.
H. Lee, Warburg
Pincus

KKR Financial
Corp.**

Blackstone,
Goldman

Non-Winning PE
Firm(s)
Invited Into Deal

Aramark
Blackstone*,
Permira, Carlyle,
TPG

Blackstone,
Goldman, KKR

Winning PE
Firm(s)

Freescale

Apollo, TPG

Transaction

Harrah’s

Notes: * Includes BCIP, a limited partner of Blackstone, controlled by Bain’s senior managing directors. **The
debt arm of KKR.
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1020-2 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 12, 2014),
at 30.
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Winning PE
Firm(s)

Bain, KKR, Merrill
Lynch

Transaction
HCA

AIG, Carlyle,
Goldman Sachs
Bain, Blackstone,
Goldman Sachs,
KKR, Providence,
Silver Lake, TPG
Goldman Sachs,
J.P. Morgan, KKR,
TPG

Kinder
Morgan

SunGard

TXU

Yes

No

Was a nonwinning PE
firm invited
into the deal?

No

No

No

Was a nonwinning PE firm
brought into the
deal?

Non-Winning
PE Firm(s)
Brought Into
Deal

Apollo,
Blackstone, KKR,
TPG

Yes

No

Non-Winning PE
Firm(s)
Invited Into Deal

Carlyle, T.H. Lee

No

Notes: * Includes BCIP, a limited partner of Blackstone, controlled by Bain’s senior managing directors. **The
debt arm of KKR.
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1020-2 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 12, 2014),
at 30.

20

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss1/2

[VOL. 87
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
48

Table 3 (cont.)
Independent Plus Factor 3: Redistribution of Gains and Losses

Burke et al.: Masters of the Universe: Bid Rigging by Private Equity Firms in M

2018]

BID RIGGING BY PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS

49

Plus factor 4: Bid reduction below competitive benchmark prices
As Kovacic et al. discuss:
The primary way to determine whether any bids at a procurement,
or a set of procurements, came from an explicit cartel requires a
benchmark that is considered noncollusive. A benchmark could be
a time period, a geographic region, or a related but separate
product. The analytic requirements are substantial when evaluating
bid data relative to a benchmark. If that analysis is done well, the
results can constitute a super plus factor—that is, actions or
conduct (in this case, pricing) that are highly unlikely to occur in
the absence of a collusive agreement. One way to do this analysis
well requires that a reliable predictive econometric model be
estimated for a benchmark, usually a time period, where conduct
is thought to be noncollusive.58
The findings of Officer et al. (2010) provide economic evidence on this
plus factor.59 In particular, they show that, on average, the premium paid
in club deals by large PE firms (which include Defendants in Dahl) in
transactions over $100 million is statistically significantly lower by
approximately 40% than premiums in non-club deals. In contrast, Boone
and Mulherin,60 and Comment61 consider the effect of club deals in
transactions above and below $100 million (which includes bids from
many relatively small PE firms who were not defendants in Dahl) and
find that club deals do not result in lower premiums than non-club deals.
Thus, the economics literature suggests that club deals do not lower
premiums, all else equal, when the sample includes relatively small
transactions. In contrast, club deals lead to lower premiums, all else equal,
when the transactions are restricted to larger dollar values. The 40% lower
premiums, all else equal, found by Officer et al. constitute a plus factor—
that is, pricing behavior unlikely to occur in the absence of a collusive
agreement.62
Plus factor 5: Communication and monitoring
Communication among bidders is integral to the successful operation
58. See, e.g., supra note 41, at 420.
59. Supra note 15.
60. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Do Private Equity Consortiums Facilitate Collusion
in Takeover Bidding?, 17 J. OF CORP. FIN. 1475 (2011).
61. Robert Comment, Team Bidding by Private Equity Sponsors: Are the Antitrust Allegations
Plausible?” 23 J. OF APPLIED FIN. 111 (2013).
62. See, e.g., supra note 41, at 393.
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of a cartel. As Kovacic et al. discuss:
Communication is a central part of the operation of a cartel. We
are concerned with communication that reflects the ongoing nature
of the conspiracy. In general, if a seller (receiver) knows something
about another seller (sender) an immediate question arises: Was
there no legitimate unilateral function for the sender in
communicating such information to the receiver? Overall,
information is a valuable commodity. For one seller to know
information about a rival is to give that seller a competitive
advantage. A competitor has no unilateral interest in
disadvantaging itself relative to its rivals.63
The economic evidence shows that each of the Defendant PE firms
exchanged types of information that would not be in their unilateral selfinterest to exchange absent the existence of an agreement. For example,
the firms exchanged information at times in the bidding for a given LBO
that would not be in their unilateral self-interests absent the existence of
an agreement on bid levels and bid strategy with ostensible horizontal
competitors. A compendium of examples of such communications is
presented in Table 4.

63. Id. at 423.
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Winning PE
Firm(s)

AMC

Apollo, J.P.
Morgan

Transaction

Aramark

Goldman
Sachs, J.P.
Morgan, T.
H. Lee,
Warburg
Pincus

Freescale

Blackstone,
Carlyle,
Permira,
TPG

Non-Winning PE
Firm(s)
Bain, Blackstone,
Carlyle,
Goldman, T. H.
Lee, TPG
Apollo, Bain,
Blackstone,
Carlyle, KKR,
TPG

Bain, KKR, Silver
Lake

Evidence of communication/monitoring between PE firms

1. Apollo spoke to TPG, Blackstone and THL regarding a coinvestment. J.P. Morgan was offered exclusivity on AMC.
1. Apollo approached GS PIA regarding a co-invest as a quid pro
quo for Nalco and Cablecom. GS PIA did not cut Apollo in on
Aramark, but offered the Kinder Morgan deal or another “special
opportunity.” Despite being shut out, Apollo did not mount a
competing bid.
1. BX had discussions with TPG after submitting a solo bid.
1A. BX invited TPG to “mitigate the risk of competition…”

1B. KKR offered BX an “olive branch” on Vivendi if “they don’t do
something stupid on HCA and we prevail on Freescale.”
1C. KKR congratulated BX and BX stated “we would much rather
work with you guys than against you. Together we can be
unstoppable but in opposition we can cost each other a lot of
money.”
1D. As reciprocation, BX invited KKR into Clear Channel.
2. KKR/SLP/Bain/Apax club considered letting BX acquire
Freescale then approaching them with an NXP merger later, “why
bid up unnecessarily?”
2A. Eventually the club pulled out of bidding to “facilitate bringing
things together down the road.”
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Winning
PE
Firm(s)
Bain,
Blackstone,
Goldman, T.
H. Lee

NonWinning PE
Firm(s)

1. Apollo notified TPG of the deal, TPG believed they needed to reciprocate.

Evidence of communication/monitoring between PE firms

Harrah’s

Apollo,
TPG

Apollo,
Blackstone,
Carlyle,
Goldman, T.
H. Lee, TPG

Transaction

HCA

Bain,
KKR,
Merrill
Lynch

1. TPG, GS PIA, BX and TCG stood down based on request form KKR. HCA’s
advisors were in a “frenzy” to create a competing consortium.
1A. TPG approached KKR, Bain and JPM about getting a piece of HCA—Each
firm expressed an interest in letting TPG in but the HCA board opposed (as TPG
was the most likely to make a competing offer).
1B. After telling KKR and Bain they passed, TPG stated “All we can do is do onto
others as we want them to do unto us… it will pay off in the long run even though
it feels bad in the short run.”
2. Apollo wanted to form a competing consortium after Merrill’s “snub” on HCA,
but quickly stood down for fear of topping a KKR deal.
3. When KKR submitted a bid on Freescale, BX’s Freescale consortium threatened
to go after HCA as retaliation and signed a confidentiality agreement
3A. BUT once KKR stood down on Freescale, BX dropped HCA. BX also stated
that they didn’t want to jump a deal even though “it is a shame we let KKR get
away with highway robbery.”

AIG,
Carlyle,
Goldman
Sachs

Apollo,
Bain,
Blackstone,
KKR, TPG
Kinder
Morgan

1. The Kinder Morgan deal was a quid pro quo for TCG and GS PIA.
1A. Carlyle thought that KM was its payback for EDMC.
2. GS PIA confidentiality agreement created exclusivity with potential coinvestors.
3. Apollo felt that GS PIA owed them a “special deal” and didn’t view Kinder in
the same category as Aramark.
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Table 4(cont.)
Independent Plus Factor 5: Communication And Monitoring
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Transaction

SunGard

TXU

Winning PE
Firm(s)

Bain, Blackstone,
Goldman Sachs,
KKR, Providence,
Silver Lake, TPG

Goldman Sachs,
J.P. Morgan,
KKR, TPG

Non-Winning PE
Firm(s)

Carlyle, T. H. Lee

Apollo

Evidence of communication/monitoring between PE firms
1. TPG and BX were offered a co-invest after they considered
forming a rival consortium.
2. TPG told its team that being overly aggressive would only
benefit shareholders and cost SLP.
3. PEP agreed that they owed KKR for SunGard.

4. SLP and KKR discussed future partnering and reciprocation.

5. SLP contacted BX to discuss lack of reciprocity after SunGard.
BX wondered what the Quid Pro Quo was for SunGard, thought
about offering Freescale.
1. Apollo approached TPG about getting in on TXU; also
considered cashing in KKR “favor” for access to the deal.

2. TCG tried to get in the deal; GS referred them to TPG or KKR.
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1020-2 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 12, 2014), at 32-34.
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Plus factor 6: Large club deals reduce number of bidders
Plaintiffs’ alleged that Defendant PE firms formed clubs to reduce the
already limited number of PE firms that could participate in a given LBO
transaction.64 As discussed above, auction theory shows that a reduction
in the number of bidders will, on average, lead to a reduction in the
winning bid. To examine this claim, Plaintiffs’ expert economists
conducted an empirical study of 3,080 LBOs in the United States
completed in the period 1981 through July 2012. The sample consisted of
all completed LBOs during this period for which data on the value of the
transaction was publicly available.65 For each transaction, Plaintiffs’
expert economists identified the value of the transaction, the number of
bidders, and the presence or absence of a club. A club is defined as present
if more than one investor in the transaction is a financial sponsor or has a
financial sponsor parent. The dependent variable (i.e., the variable to be
explained) was a binary variable that equaled one if the number of bidders
was two or more and zero if the number of bidders was one. The
regression analysis allowed Plaintiffs’ expert economists to test
empirically whether the presence of a club (on average) had a statistically
significant effect on the dependent variable (i.e., whether the transaction
had more than one bidder) controlling for the value of the transaction. The
results of the regression analysis showed that the presence of a club led to
a statistically significant reduction in the likelihood of having more than
one bidder in a transaction, holding constant the value of the transaction
(see Table 5, Model 1). We also find that this likelihood is reduced even
further for larger transactions (see Table 5, Model 2). These findings show
that the likelihood of a competing bid is significantly reduced in large
club deals.

64. Redacted Fifth Amended Complaint at 2-3, Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners LLC, No. 1:07-cv12388-EFH (D. Mass. Oct. 10, 2012).
65. B. ESPEN ECKBO, 2 CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: MODERN EMPIRICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BIDDING
STRATEGIES, FINANCING AND CORPORATE CONTROL 905, note 5 (2010) (“The dollar value of the
transaction is the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. It includes
the amount paid for all common stock, common stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, assets,
warrants, and stake purchases made within 6 months of the announcement date of the transaction.
Assumed liabilities are included in the value if they are publicly disclosed. Preferred stock is included
only if it is being acquired as part of a 100% acquisition. If a portion of the consideration paid by the
acquirer is common stock, the stock is valued by using the closing price on the last full trading day before
the announcement of the terms of the stock swap. If the exchange ratio of shares offered changes, the
stock is valued based on its closing price on the last full trading date before the date of the exchange ratio
change.”).
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Table 5
Independent Plus Factor 6: Large Club Deals Reduce Number Of
Bidders
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

1.27e-5***

2.05e-5***

(1.80e-6)

(2.50e-6)

-0.05***

-0.03*

(0.01)

(0.01)

Value of Transaction

Club
-1.60e-5***

Value of Transaction ×
Club

(3.58e-6)
0.03***

0.03***

(0.004)

(0.004)

Number of Observations

3,080

3,080

F Statistic

26.6

24.5

Prob > F

0.000

0.000

Adjusted R-Squared

0.02

0.02

Constant

Source: Thomson One.
Note: Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

To further evaluate these results, we also split the 3,080 transactions
into different groups based on their values. In particular, we split the
transactions into two groups depending on whether the transaction value
is less than $1 billion. The first row, second column of Table 5 shows that
if the transaction value is less than $1 billion, then the fact that the
winning bidder is a club has no statistically significant effect on whether
there are two or more bidders. In contrast, the first row, third column of
Table 5 shows that if the transaction value is greater than or equal to $1
billion, the fact that the winning bidder is a club has a statistically
significant and negative effect on whether there are two or more bidders.
Table 6 shows similar results when the 3,080 transactions are split into
two groups depending on whether the transaction value is less than $1.5
billion, $2.0 billion, $2.5 billion, and $3.0 billion. In each case, the results
show that if the transaction value is greater than or equal to a given dollar

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

27

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2

56

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

amount, the fact that the winning bidder is a club has a statistically
significant and negative effect on whether there are two or more bidders.
In addition, these negative effects are larger in column 3 than in column
2. That is, the negative effects are larger for the larger transaction values.
These findings show that the likelihood of a competing bid is significantly
reduced in large club deals, in fact the coefficient more than quadruples
in size. As discussed above, economic theory shows that a reduction in
the number of bidders will, on average, lead to a reduction in the winning
bid. These findings provide evidence that the formation of clubs in large
transactions reduced competition.
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Table 6
Independent Plus Factor 6: Large Club Deals Reduce Number Of
Bidders
Sample Split (S)

Coefficient of Club Dummy

($ billion)

Transaction Value < S

Transaction Value ≥ S

-0.02

-0.14***

(0.02)

(0.04)

-0.03*

-0.18***

(0.01)

(0.05)

-0.04**

-0.17***

(0.01)

(0.06)

-0.04***

-0.18***

(0.01)

(0.06)

-0.04***

-0.19***

(0.01)

(0.07)

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0
Source: Thomson One.
Notes:
The regression equation is Indicator (Number of Bidders > 1) = α + βX + ε,
where X = [Value of the transaction, Club Dummy].
Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses. Symbols ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Summary of Plus Factors
To perform a thorough economic analysis to ascertain the likelihood of
collusion, one cannot simply isolate a single plus factor. Rather, one must
look at the economic evidence and plus factors as a whole to understand
whether the possibility of independent (and therefore lawful) action tends
to be excluded. When considering the plus factors jointly across the
totality of the deals and the nature of the repeated interactions of the
market participants, Plaintiffs’ expert economists found that their
economic analyses showed that Defendants’ actions in the transactions at
issue were consistent with coordinated behavior but inconsistent with
competition. They also concluded the Defendants’ actions in the
transactions at issue were more likely than not the result of a market
allocation and bid rigging agreement.
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APPENDIX II: DAMAGES ANALYSIS
IRRs but for the Market Allocation and Bid rigging Agreement
We next analyze the values PE firms would be willing to pay for the
eight LBO transactions. A number of different inputs were employed in
the PE firms’ analyses, e.g., debt structure, dividend schedule, exit
multiple, interest rate, management options, and required cash. The IRRs
of the PE firms would have been inflated during the conspiracy period
because they were artificially lowering the sales prices of the eight
transactions through their alleged market allocation and bid rigging
agreement. Therefore, from a damages perspective, it was important to
determine what the IRRs in the eight transactions would have been but
for the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement.
Within our auction-theoretic methodology, we present two approaches
to estimate the but-for competitive IRRs. First, we employ the wellaccepted Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”). Second, we use
calculations of PE firms’ IRRs provided by Ewen et al.66 The advantage
of the CAPM approach is that it allows one to address the specific risks
of each LBO separately using a well-accepted, common methodology.
Using the average IRR earned by PE firms in their buyout funds to
estimate the but-for competitive IRRs is consistent with investors having
a common target return for PE funds.
For these reasons, the CAPM approach provided a well-accepted,
reliable, and common methodology for measuring damages on a
classwide basis using information common to the proposed class that is
more tailored to the specific characteristics of each LBO transaction.
Using the average IRR earned by PE firms in their buyout funds provided
a cross check on the CAPM approach on a classwide basis using
information common to the proposed class.
Estimating the But-For Competitive IRRs Using CAPM
The CAPM is “the first, most famous, and (so far) most widely used
model in asset pricing.”67 The CAPM was developed by William Sharpe
and John Lintner,68 in work that was awarded a Nobel Prize. The CAPM
66. Michael Ewens, Charles Jones & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, The Price of Diversifiable Risk in
Venture Capital and Private Equity, 26 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1854 (2013).
67. See JOHN H. COCHRANE, ASSET PRICING 152 (2005).
68. William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions
of Risk, 19 J. OF FIN. 425 (1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risky Assets and the Selection of Risky
Investment in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); and John
Lintner, Security Prices, Risky and Maximal Gains from Diversification, 20 J. OF FIN. 587 (1965).
Professor Lintner passed away before the Nobel Prize was awarded to Professor Sharpe in 1990.
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relates the expected return of an asset to the market rate of return, the riskfree rate of return, and the asset’s risk.69 According to the CAPM the
return on an asset equals:
𝛼 + 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓 ),
where 𝛼 measures the “excess return,” 𝑟𝑓 denotes the risk-free rate of
return, 𝑟𝑚 denotes the expected market rate of return, and 𝛽 is a measure
of the systematic risk of the asset’s return relative to the return on the
market portfolio.70 A fundamental implication of the CAPM is that if the
market is efficient in its use of information, then the predicted value of 𝛼,
the excess return, equals zero. Thus, the variance in returns to a given
asset is solely due to its riskiness.
However, if the excess return 𝛼 for a PE firm equals zero, that implies
that the PE firm delivers zero value to its investors over the market return.
Thus, for each transaction, the Plaintiffs needed to estimate the
competitive market return (i.e., the CAPM return) as well as the 𝛼 that a
PE firm expects to earn in a competitive environment that would cover
the sum of management fees, expenses, and any other additional returns.
In this case, there was only one transaction, Freescale, for which a jump
bid occurred when a group of Defendant PE firms allegedly attempted to
“cheat” on the collusive agreement. We use this natural experiment to
calibrate the expected excess return, 𝛼, required to generate a competitive
IRR. Since Freescale had highest riskiness, i.e., 𝛽, among the LBO
transactions, calculating the but-for competitive IRRs for the other seven
transactions using the 𝛼 derived from the Freescale transaction was
conservative.
To estimate the but-for competitive IRR for each transaction using the
CAPM methodology, we estimate the competitive excess return, 𝛼, as
follows. The evidence on record demonstrated that by September 10,
2006 the Freescale board of directors accepted a buyout offer share price
of $38 submitted by Blackstone and its group.71 Later the same day, the
group consisting of KKR, Silver Lake, Bain, and Apax Partners
Worldwide, LLP (“KKR Group”) submitted a written indication of
interest to the Freescale board for a price of $40.00-$42.00. It stated that
“should the board elect to move forward and enter into a definitive
agreement with the other consortium . . . we will immediately withdraw

69. See, e.g., supra note 67, at 3-33.
70. See, e.g., supra note 66, at 1870.
71. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., Schedule 14A (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
October
19,
2006
at
28),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1272547/000119312506210856/ddefm14a.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2018); 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass), Document 1031, at n. 491.
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our offer, and we have decided we would not participate in any
subsequent market check or other exploratory process.”72 The letter also
indicated that “[u]pon receiving access to due diligence information and
meetings with management, we would consider increasing our valuation
. . . .”73 The indication of interest “stressed the KKR/SLP Group’s view
that it could pay more for the Company than any other buyer due to the
synergies that they could generate by combining Freescale with the
semiconductor business that it was under contract to acquire . . . .”74 The
letter further acknowledged the KKR Group could generate over $500
million in synergies through a combination of Philips and Freescale.75
On September 14, 2006, the Blackstone group submitted a formal offer
of $40 per share.76 Freescale’s board accepted the offer and entered into
a definitive agreement with the Blackstone group on September 15,
2006.77 Consistent with the KKR Group’s written indication of interest
cited above, our analysis of the Defendant PE firms’ valuation models
confirmed that the KKR Group was indeed the high value bidder but stood
down and stopped bidding. Using the midpoint of the KKR Group’s stated
opening range of offered share prices, we conclude that the but-for
competitive price of the Freescale transaction equaled $41 per share.
Hence, the but-for competitive IRR for the Freescale transaction was the
IRR at which the equity valuation per share equals $41.78 If competition
had continued, the price may have been even higher.79
Next, the parameters of the CAPM using evidence common to the
proposed class members. We estimate the risk-free rate of return, 𝑟𝑓 , using
data obtained from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.80 A
72. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass.), Document 1031, ¶219.
73. Id.
74. Supra note 71.
75. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass.), Document 1031, ¶219.
76. Supra note 71, at 30.
77. Id. at 31-32.
78. With regard to the Freescale transaction, the Plaintiffs noted that the effort by the KKR Group
to “cheat” on the collusive agreement affected the process by which the ultimate price of the transaction
was determined. Cheating by members of a cartel or bidding ring was common and detecting cheating
and enforcing the collusive agreement was an important part of a successful cartel or bidding ring. See,
e.g., ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND
BIDDING RINGS, ch. 1, 2, 6 & 10 and especially pp. 103-104 (2012). Thus, the effect of the collusive
agreement in lowering the actual price below the competitive price in the Freescale transaction was less
than that in the other seven deals.
79. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs could have used the Blackstone valuation model with a share price
of $41, which yields a competitive IRR of 18.12%. This would imply that, but for the market allocation
and bid rigging agreement, Blackstone would have continued to bid until dropping out at $41 following
the September 10, 2006 written indication of interest to the Freescale board from the KKR Group. In this
case, the competitive price would equal the second highest valuation, i.e., $41 since KKR Group’s
valuation is the highest. This approach would yield a lower competitive α for Freescale equal to 4.74%.
As a result, total damages would increase.
80. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FRED ECONOMIC DATA, 10-Year
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commonly used risk-free rate of return is the 10-year U.S. Treasury
constant maturity rate. We use the latest date, on or before the LBO
announcement date, for which the 10-year constant maturity rate was
reported. We estimate the expected market rate of return, 𝑟𝑚 , using S&P
500 index data obtained from the data repository maintained by economist
Professor Robert Shiller, winner of the 2013 Nobel Prize in Economics.81
We use the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P
500 index for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index
was introduced) to the month before the deal announcement date for the
expected market rate of return. Each transaction’s risk measure, 𝛽, was
estimated using data obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (“CRSP”), a research center at the University of Chicago Booth
School of Business that provides historical data on security prices and
returns.82 We estimate 𝛽 using CRSP data for the five-year period up to
six months prior to the announcement of the transaction. Having
estimated the risk-free rate of return, the market rate of return, the risk
measure 𝛽, and the competitive price for the Freescale transaction, we
solve for 𝛼 and thus obtain the competitive but-for IRR for each
transaction.
Using the $40 valuation per share of the second highest bidder, i.e.,
Blackstone, yielded a but-for competitive IRR equal to 19.57% for
Freescale. This IRR significantly exceeded the market rate of return83 as
well as academic estimates of the average IRRs of PE firms, e.g., Ewens
et al. and Ang and Sorenson.84 Since the CAPM predicted return for
Freescale equaled 13.38%, i.e., when 𝛼 equals zero, we determine that the
competitive 𝛼 for Freescale equals 6.19%.85 We then used Freescale’s
competitive 𝛼 to calculate the competitive IRR of the other seven
transactions.

Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (DGS10), http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DGS10.
81. ROBERT SHILLER, ONLINE DATA ROBERT SHILLER, Stock Market Data,
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
82. About CRSP, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO BOOTH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, CENTER FOR
RESEARCH IN SECURITY PRICES, http://www.crsp.com/about-crsp. (“As one of the 12 Research and
Learning Centers at Chicago Booth, CRSP bridges theory and practice with trusted data solutions. . . .
Since 1960, CRSP has provided research-quality data to scholarly researchers and advanced the body of
knowledge in finance, economics and related disciplines. Today, nearly 500 leading academic institutions
in 35 countries rely on CRSP data for academic research and to support classroom instructions.”).
83. Supra note 81.
84. Andrew Ang & Morten Sorensen, Risks, Returns, and Optimal Holdings of Private Equity: A
Survey of Existing Approaches, 2 Q. J. OF FIN. 1250011-1 (2012).
85. The Plaintiffs’ estimate of Freescale’s α was consistent with other estimates of excess return
in the academic literature. See, e.g., Michael Ewens, Charles Jones & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, The Price
of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity, 26 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 1854 (2013).
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Estimating the But-For Competitive IRRs Using Information Provided in
Ewens et al.
We determine the PE firms’ but-for competitive IRRs using
information provided by Ewens, Jones, and Rhodes-Kropf.86 They
reported that the annualized equal-weighted IRR of buyout funds for the
period 1980 to 2007 was 13.24%.87 Based on the Defendant PE firms’
offering of limited partnership interests, we add the fund’s costs, e.g.,
management fees and carried interest, by requiring that a limited partner
pay 20% annually to the fund’s general partners.88 Thus, To earn 13.24%
after paying these fees, the limited partners in a fund must have earned
16.55%, i.e., (1 – 0.20) x 16.55% = 13.24%. Therefore, the but-for
competitive IRR equaled 16.55%.
Estimating PE Firms’ But-For Equity Valuations Per Share
We next estimate what the PE firms’ equity valuations per share for
each LBO transaction would have been but for the alleged market
allocation and bid rigging agreement. A PE firm’s but-for equity valuation
per share for a transaction is the maximum price per share it is willing to
pay, given the competitive but-for IRR. Appendix III provides a detailed
description of the methodology used to estimate PE firms’ equity
valuations per share for the eight transactions.
Using the methodology described above, we estimate what the
competitive prices in the eight transactions would have been but for the
alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. For each LBO
transaction, damages were the difference between the competitive price
and the actual share price, multiplied by the transaction-specific number
of common shares. Importantly, our methodology used the PE firms’ own
valuation documents, LBO models, and inputs. The actual price was the
LBO’s offer share price. Based on this analysis, we conclude that there is
a reliable and common methodology using common evidence that could
be applied to ascertain whether the PE firms’ conduct resulted in antitrust
impact and damages to proposed class members.
Damages Using the CAPM to Estimate But-For Competitive IRRs
Tables 1 to 8 show the results of the Plaintiffs’ antitrust damages for
the eight transactions, using the transaction-specific but-for competitive

86. Supra note 66.
87. See supra note 66, at 1869, table 1.
88. See, e.g., Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV.
OF FIN. STUD. 2303 (2010).
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IRRs estimated using the CAPM methodology. For example, Table 1
shows PE firms’ equity valuations per share for AMC, as well as the PE
firms’ equity valuations per share multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 , the
transaction-specific number of common shares. As shown in Table 1, the
competitive price, i.e., the second highest equity value per share, exceeds
the actual price and therefore, we conclude that the proposed class
members incurred damages in the AMC transaction.
Tables 1 to 8 show that for all eight transactions, the competitive price
exceeds the actual price. The results show that proposed class members
incurred damages in each of the eight transactions. Since damages for the
eight transactions are positive, we conclude that there was an antitrust
impact from the alleged market allocation and bid rigging agreement. As
shown in Table 9, total damages across all eight transactions equal
approximately $11.97 billion.
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Table 1
Amc Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 15.59%
Equity Valuation
per Share ($)/1

Equity Valuation per Share
Multiplied by N Common ($mil)

Apollo

22.52

834.8

Blackstone
Goldman
Sachs
J.P. Morgan

20.56

762.2

19.14

709.6

21.00

778.5

21.00

778.5

19.50

722.9

PE Firm

Competitive
Price/2
Actual Price
Antitrust
Damages/3

55.6

Notes:
/1
PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%. The IRR was
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV. The market
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500
index for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June
2004 (i.e., the month before the deal announcement date). The risk-free rate is the 10-year
treasury constant maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which
the 10-year treasury constant maturity rate was reported. The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated
using CRSP data for the five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the
transaction.
/2
For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the
second highest equity valuation.
/3
Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual
price per share, multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 .
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass.
filed Aug. 1, 2014), at 6.
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Table 2
Aramark Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR= 13.46%

PE Firm

Equity Valuation
per Share ($)/1

Equity Valuation per Share
Multiplied by N Common ($mil)

Blackstone
Goldman
Sachs
J.P. Morgan

34.66

6,246.9

36.05

6,497.4

36.10

6,506.4

KKR

35.45

6,388.4

T.H. Lee
Warburg
Pincus
Competitive
Price/2
Actual Price

35.87

6,464.3

36.04

6,495.1

36.05

6,497.4

33.80

6,091.9

Antitrust
Damages/3

405.5

Notes:
/1
PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%. The IRR was
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV. The market rate
of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index for the
period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., the month
before the deal announcement date). The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant maturity rate
on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury constant
maturity rate was reported. The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the five-year
period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction.
/2
For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second
highest equity valuation.
/3
Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price per
share, multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 .
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed Aug.
1, 2014), at 7.
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Table 3
Freescale Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 19.57%
PE Firm

Equity Valuation
per Share ($)/1

Equity Valuation per Share
Multiplied by N Common ($mil)

AIG

37.10

15,336.8

Blackstone

40.00

16,534.9

Carlyle
KKR/Silver
Lake
TPG

38.04

15,724.7

46.08

19,047.3

37.90

15,666.6

41.00

16,948.2

40.00

16,534.9

Competitive
Price/2
Actual Price
Antitrust
Damages/3

413.4

Notes:
PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%. The IRR was
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV. The market
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index
for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e.,
the month before the deal announcement date). The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant
maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury
constant maturity rate was reported. The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the
five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction.
/2
For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second
highest equity valuation.
/3
Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price
per share, multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 .
/1

Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed
Aug. 1, 2014), at 8.
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Table 4
Harrah’s Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 17.02%
PE Firm
Blackstone
Goldman
Sachs
TPG
Competitive
Price/2
Actual Price
Antitrust
Damages/3

Equity Valuation
per Share ($)/1

Equity Valuation per Share
Multiplied by N Common ($mil)

91.17

16,915.6

93.78

17,400.7

95.64

17,745.8

93.78

17,400.7

90.00

16,699.3
701.4

Notes:
/1
PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%. The IRR was
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV. The market
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index
for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e.,
the month before the deal announcement date). The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant
maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury
constant maturity rate was reported. The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the
five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction.
/2
For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second
highest equity valuation.
/3
Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price
per share, multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 .
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed
Aug. 1, 2014), at 9.
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Table 5
HCA Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 13.71%
PE Firm

Equity Valuation
per Share ($)/1

Equity Valuation per Share
Multiplied by N Common ($mil)

Bain

52.01

21,300.6

Blackstone

60.14

24,630.2

Carlyle
Goldman
Sachs
KKR

56.01

22,938.8

67.21

27,525.7

50.70

20,762.0

Merrill Lynch

56.90

23,304.4

60.14

24,630.2

51.00

20,886.9

Competitive
Price/2
Actual Price
Antitrust
Damages/3

3,743.3

Notes:
/1
PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%. The IRR was
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV. The market
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index
for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e.,
the month before the deal announcement date). The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant
maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury
constant maturity rate was reported. The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the
five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction.
/2
For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second
highest equity valuation.
/3
Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price
per share, multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 .
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed
Aug. 2, 2014), at 10.
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Table 6
Kinder Morgan Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 14.38%
PE Firm

Equity Valuation
per Share ($)/1

Equity Valuation per Share
Multiplied by N Common ($mil)

Apollo

100.92

13,522.3

Blackstone

100.35

13,446.0

Carlyle

137.80

18,463.9

Goldman Sachs

149.55

20,038.3

KKR

138.30

18,530.9

J.P. Morgan

157.15

21,056.7

TPG

102.32

13,709.9

149.55

20,038.3

107.50

14,404.0

Competitive
Price/2
Actual Price
Antitrust
Damages/3

5,634.3

Notes:
/1
PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%. The IRR was
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV. The market rate
of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index for the
period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., the month
before the deal announcement date). The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant maturity
rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury constant
maturity rate was reported. The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the five-year
period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction.
/2
For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second
highest equity valuation.
/3
Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price
per share, multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 .
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed
Aug. 1, 2014), at 11.
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Table 7
Sungard Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 17.14%
PE Firm

Equity Valuation
per Share ($)/1

Equity Valuation per Share
Multiplied by N Common ($mil)

Bain

38.02

11,038.7

Blackstone

35.48

10,301.7

Carlyle

36.35

10,553.6

KKR

35.23

10,227.2

Silver Lake

38.78

11,259.4

T.H. Lee

33.59

9,751.6

TPG

37.85

10,990.7

38.02

11,038.7

36.00

10,452.2

Competitive
Price/2
Actual Price
Antitrust
Damages/3

586.5

Notes:
/1
PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.59%. The IRR was
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV. The market rate
of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index for the
period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to June 2004 (i.e., the month
before the deal announcement date). The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury constant maturity
rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year treasury constant
maturity rate was reported. The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data for the five-year
period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction.
/2
For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second
highest equity valuation.
/3
Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price
per share, multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 .
Source:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed
Aug. 1, 2014), at 12.
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Table 8
TXU Antitrust Damages Analysis: IRR = 15.68%
PE Firm

Equity Valuation
per Share ($)/1

Equity Valuation per Share
Multiplied by N Common ($mil)

Apollo/2

75.00

34,589.7

Blackstone

66.12

30,494.3

Goldman Sachs

68.00

31,361.4

J.P. Morgan

70.18

32,366.8

KKR

67.20

30,993.1

TPG

69.91

32,244.3

70.18

32,366.8

69.25

31,937.9

Competitive
Price/3
Actual Price
Antitrust
Damages/4

428.9

Notes:
/1
PE firms’ equity valuations per share were estimated using an IRR of 15.68%. The IRR was
estimated using the CAPM methodology explained in Section II and Appendix IV. The market
rate of return equals the dividend-reinvested compound annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index
for the period March 1957 (i.e., the month the S&P 500 index was introduced) to January 2007
(i.e., the month before the deal announcement date). The risk-free rate is the 10-year treasury
constant maturity rate on the latest date, on or before the announcement date, for which the 10-year
treasury constant maturity rate was reported. The risk measure, 𝛽, was estimated using CRSP data
for the five-year period up to six months prior to the announcement of the transaction.
/2
For Apollo, the equity valuation per share was obtained from APOLLO106617.pdf, which
reports an offer price per share of $75.00 for an IRR of 17.6%, but does not report offer prices per
share for IRRs lower than 17.6%. Since the offer price per share increases as the IRR decreases,
using the offer price per share at the higher IRR of 17.6% is conservative.
/3
For the reasons explained in Section II and Appendix III, the competitive price equals the second
highest equity valuation.
/4
Antitrust damages equal the difference between the competitive price per share and actual price
per share, multiplied by 𝑁 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 .
Sources:
Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, No. 1:07-cv-12388-WGY Document 1014-1 (D. Mass. filed
Aug. 1, 2014), at 13.
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Table 9
Antitrust Damages Analysis Summary

Deal

Competitive
Price ($mil)

Actual Price
($mil)

Damages
($mil)

AMC

778.5

722.9

55.6

Aramark

6,497.4

6,091.9

405.5

Freescale

16,948.2

16,534.9

413.4

Harrah’s

17,400.7

16,699.3

701.4

HCA
Kinder
Morgan
SunGard

24,630.2

20,886.9

3,743.3

20,038.3

14,404.0

5,634.3

11,038.7

10,452.2

586.5

TXU

32,366.8

31,937.9

428.9

Total
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APPENDIX III: EQUITY VALUATION METHODOLOGY
A PE firm’s equity valuation per share for a transaction is the
maximum price per share the firm is willing to pay, given its target IRR.
For each transaction, we first select each PE firm’s most recent internal
LBO analysis document that contains sufficient data and information to
estimate the equity valuation per share using the methodology described
in this appendix. Furthermore, in the case of winning PE firms, we only
consider documents reporting LBO analysis conducted prior to the LBO
announcement date. PE firms’ internal LBO analysis documents report
predicted IRRs for given share prices and assumptions on future target
firm cash flows and exit values. In all other instances, we obtain data from
the PE firms’ LBO analysis documents to estimate equity valuations per
share. Thus, for each transaction, our methodology to estimate a PE firm’s
equity valuation per share uses the PE firms’ own LBO analysis
methodology.
The selected document is either an Excel spreadsheet or is in PDF
format. When the selected document is an Excel spreadsheet, we estimate
the PE firm’s equity valuation per share by determining the share price at
which the PE firm’s predicted IRR equals the competitive IRR.
When the selected document is in PDF format, we use one of the
following three methodologies depending on transaction-specific factors
and the particular plans of the PE firm:
Methodology I: Using PE Firm’s Exit EV/EBITDA Multiple
Under this methodology, no dividends are paid before the exit year and
the exit year total enterprise value (𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑇 ) is calculated as the product of
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑇 and exit EV/EBITDA multiple (𝜒). For a given target IRR
level (𝑟), we estimate the equity valuation per share using the following
steps:
Step 1: Estimating equity investment (𝐸0 )
The terminal equity value, 𝐸𝑇 , is given by
𝐸𝑇 = 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑇 + 𝐶𝑇 − 𝐷𝑇

(1)

where 𝐶𝑇 and 𝐷𝑇 denote cash on hand and total debt at the exit year. Cash
payment to new sponsors, 𝐼𝑇 , i:
𝐼𝑇 = 𝜔𝑇 𝐸𝑇 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 𝜔𝑇 𝐸𝑇 + 𝛾𝐸0
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where 𝜔 𝑇 , 𝑂𝑃𝑇 , 𝛼, and 𝐸0 denote the sponsor’s ownership percentage at
the exit time, management option proceeds at the exit time, percent of
equity that are management options, and total equity investment at the
LBO time.89
New sponsor’s equity investment, 𝐼0 , can be calculated using the
definition of IRR as follows:90
𝐼0 = 𝜔0 𝐸0 = 𝐼𝑇 (1 + 𝑟)−𝑇

(3)

where 𝜔0 denotes the sponsor’s ownership percentage at the LBO time.
From equations (2) and (3), we derive the following expression for 𝐸0 :
𝐸0 =

𝜔𝑇 𝐸𝑇
𝑇

(4)

𝜔0 (1 + 𝑟) − 𝛾

Step 2: Estimating the total purchase price (𝑇𝑃𝑃0)
𝑇𝑃𝑃0 = 𝐸0 + 𝐷0 − 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠

(5)

where 𝐷0 denotes the debt financing level, and 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 denotes total LBO
financing and transaction fees.
Step 3: Estimating the equity valuation per share
Using the fact that total sources equal total uses in an LBO, we have
𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑒 = 𝑇𝑃𝑃0 + 𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝐷𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝐶0

(6)

where 𝐸𝑝𝑟𝑒 denotes total equity value paid to the shareholders, 𝐷𝑝𝑟𝑒
denotes the debt level before the LBO, 𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑒 denotes the cash level before
the LBO, and 𝐶0 denotes cash on hand after the LBO.
The equity value per share, 𝑃, is calculated as follows:

89. Option proceeds are fixed at the reported value if there is insufficient information to determine
the formula used to calculate it. Note that α equals 1-ω_T when ω_0 equals 1.
90. One PE firm’s LBO analysis of Aramark suggests that the formula 𝐼0 − 𝑆𝐷𝐹 =
𝐼𝑇 (1 + 𝑟)−𝑇 is used to estimate the IRR, where 𝑆𝐷𝐹 denotes Sponsor Deal Fees.
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(7)

where 𝑁 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the number of total diluted shares outstanding.
Methodology II: Using PE Firm’s Exit P/E Multiple
Under this methodology, no dividends are paid before the exit year and
the exit year total equity value (𝐸𝑇 ) is calculated as the product of net
income (NIT ) and exit P/E multiple (𝜙):
𝐸𝑇 = 𝜙 × 𝑁𝐼𝑇

(8)

Once 𝐸𝑇 is calculated using equation (8), the PE firm’s equity valuation
per share is estimated using equations (2) to (7).
Methodology III: Using PE Firm’s Segment Exit Multiples
Some documents do not report a company-wide exit multiple. Instead,
each segment of the company has its own EBITDA and exit multiple. In
this case, we first use the exit multiple to calculate the total enterprise
value for each segment. Then, we sum the total enterprise values across
the segments to obtain the company-wide total enterprise value, 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑇 .
The exit equity valuation is then calculated as follows:
𝐸𝑇 = 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑇 + 𝐶𝑇 − 𝐷𝑇

(9)

Once 𝐸𝑇 is calculated using equation (9), the PE firm’s equity valuation
per share is estimated using equations (2) to (7).
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